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Why do European Union (EU) member states respond differently to getting caught for 
violating EU law? How come that some member states shy away from conflict with the 
European Commission while others do not even bother to comply with rulings of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) after being convicted twice – once for infringing on EU 
law (Article 226 ECT) and the second time for not acting upon the court’s first judgment 
(Article 228 ECT)? Can power, capacity, and legitimacy approaches, which explain a 
country’s number of prosecuted violations at the first formal stage of the infringement 
proceedings, also account for the number of court referrals and judgments? Why are 
some infringement proceedings settled faster and at an earlier stage than others? To 
answer these questions, this paper tests the explanatory value of our previously devel-
oped power-capacity model (cf. Börzel et al. 2007) over the different stages of the EU 
infringement procedure and over time. We find that it works quite well, but looses ex-
planatory power across the stages of the infringement procedure. It becomes clear that 
administrative capacity helps member states avoid and overcome involuntary forms of 









The European Union (EU) has an elaborated infringement procedure with the Euro-
pean Commission as a supranational compliance monitoring institution. Nevertheless, 
non-compliance of member states with European law occurs on a regular basis (Tall-
berg 1999; Börzel 2001; Mbaye 2001; Tallberg/Jönsson 2001). States with low admin-
istrative capacities violate European rules more frequently than member states with 
highly efficient public services (cf. Börzel et al. 2007). The same holds true for (politi-
cally) powerful states, which feature a higher propensity to infringe on EU law than their 
weaker counterparts (Börzel et al. 2007). Since non-compliance can never be com-
pletely prevented, a major task for international institutions is to facilitate the transfor-
mation of non-compliance into compliance. To cope with this task, the EU can rely on 
managerial, adjudication, and enforcement mechanisms (Zangl 2001). The EU’s in-
fringement procedure (Article 226 ECT) starts off with an informal and formal manage-
rial dialogue between the Commission and the accused member state, followed by a 
Reasoned Opinion. When non-compliance prevails after the Commission has sent 
such a Reasoned Opinion, the Commission can refer the case to the ECJ and thereby 
initiate the adjudication phase. If no settlement occurs, this phase ends with a judgment 
by the ECJ. If the state still does not comply with European law, the Commission can 
initiate an enforcement procedure (based on Article 228 ECT), in which the ECJ may 
impose financial penalties. 
 
Empirically, the EU infringement procedure is a success as it ultimately succeeds in 
settling all non-compliance cases (Börzel/Cichowski 2003). However, this can take be-
tween a couple of weeks and several years. Sometimes, it requires only managerial 
instruments, but penalties have to be imposed in other instances. As the institutional 
design of the EU’s infringement procedure is constant, it cannot explain why some in-
fringement cases are settled more quickly or at an earlier stage of the procedure than 
others. Therefore, this paper inquires the following questions: Why are some cases 
settled quickly, while others take many years and/or are carried on over many stages of 
the EU infringement procedure? Why do some states shy away from conflict with the 
European Commission while others do not even bother to comply after having been 
convicted by the ECJ?  
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A combined power and capacity model explains a large amount of the variation in the 
frequency to which member states’ non-compliance occurs in the first place (Börzel et 
al. 2007). Yet, so far it is unclear whether capacity is as important for the success of 
the official infringement proceedings as it is for the explanation of the occurrence of 
non-compliance. Likewise, does power equally matter at all infringement stages? In 
other words, does the explanatory power of the combined model vary between the 
managerial, adjudication, and enforcement stages? 
 
To answer these questions, this paper proceeds in the following steps. Firstly, we out-
line the empirical puzzle by focusing on the variation in transformational patterns 
across stages of the infringement proceedings and over time (2). In order to explain the 
compliance restoring dynamics in the EU infringement proceeding, the subsequent 
section develops a set of separate and integrated process-oriented hypotheses on the 
likelihood for the settlement of non-compliance (3). The fourth section empirically tests 
the multivariate hypotheses as well as the integrated models using statistical methods 
for both variants of the dependent variable (4). The paper concludes with a summary of 
the main findings – namely that administrative capacity helps member states avoid and 
overcome involuntary forms of non-compliance, while power enables them to sit out 
long and escalating infringement proceedings – and some considerations on future 
research (5). 
 
2. Compliance Dynamics in the EU 
 
In the European Union, as in any other dispute settlement or arbitration system of in-
ternational institutions, non-compliance of states can vary over time and across stages. 
Some infringements are quickly resolved within a couple of months, while others re-
quire several years. Also, some cases can be solved at the managerial stage through 
bilateral interactions between the Commission and the respective state, while others 
are referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which issues a judgment or require 
even a threat of financial penalties to be resolved. In order to systematically analyze to 
what extent the power-capacity model can account for these variations and to highlight 
which additional variables are important for compliance dynamics, this paper distin-
guishes between two dependent variables. First, it focuses on the stages of the in-
fringement proceedings, which it takes for a case to be settled and compliance to be 
restored (‘Stages of the Infringement Proceedings’). The second variant of the depend-
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ent variable focuses on the time it takes to close an infringement case (‘Duration of the 
Infringement Proceedings’). In general, the more stages a case is carried on to, the 
more time it requires until non-compliance is abolished. Nevertheless, the distinction 
between time and stages is important, since individual cases can be pending for a long 
time within a particular stage, while other cases might be quickly transferred from one 
stage to the other. Such disparities between speed and stages sometimes have impli-
cations for the prospects of individual variables to foster compliance. The deterrence 
approach, for example, expects that cases of states successfully deterring the Com-
mission are not carried quickly from one stage to the other, but rather stay for long du-
rations in early stages of the infringement procedure. 
 
2.1. Stages of Infringement Proceedings 
 
In the European Union, the vast majority of infringement cases is solved during the 
early stages of the infringement procedure (cf. Mendrinou 1996; Tallberg/Jönsson 
2001; Tallberg 2002). Of the more than 5,000 cases, which entered the official in-
fringement proceedings between 1978 and 1999 for the EU 12 member states, less 
than one third is referred to the ECJ. Of those 1,646 referrals, the ECJ ruled on 808 
cases – in 19 out of 20 times against the member states. Only about 100 cases are 
referred to the ECJ a second time as member states do not comply with a first judg-
ment of the ECJ in accordance with article 226 of the EC treaty (cf. graph 1). In fewer 
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1  This graph and all the following graphs cover only infringements by the 12 oldest EU member states. 
The newer members are not included in these graphs in order to prevent them from being biased by a 
combination of relatively short membership and the requirement to fully transpose and implement the 
aquis communautaire on accession. 
2  This graph covers only the EU 12 member states and the time period 1986-99, i.e. the longest bal-
anced subpanel of the available data. 
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While the overall number of infringements drops sharply from stage to stage, we find 
significant variation regarding the member states’ propensity to transform non-
compliance into compliance across the stages (cf. graph 2). At the management stage, 
which is still unofficial, the difference between member states is rather modest. How-
ever, in the subsequent official stages, the initial spread of 14.6 percentage points for 
Reasoned Opinions starts to widen. It dramatically increases for the first ECJ referrals 
(20.9 percentage points) and widens another 6.5 percentage points to a maximum of 
26.5 points at the second ECJ referrals stage. However, if we ignore Italy as an ex-
treme outlier, the variance becomes somewhat less pronounced.  
 
The majority of the member states show a relatively ‘decent’ level of non-compliance. 
Five countries – Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, Luxembourg, and Ireland – remain 
well below the Community average of infringements while Spain and Germany oscillate 
around it. The only member states that reveal a consistent pattern of non-compliance 
across the stages of the infringement procedure are Italy, France, Belgium and Greece. 
Portugal’s initial performance is also rather poor, but improves significantly when enter-
ing the adjudication stage. The same applies to France, which remains, however, 
among the ‘top laggards’. The group is led by Italy, whose non-compliance record al-
most makes it a class of its own. Italy is followed by Greece, whose records remain 
consistently bad, and Belgium, whose performance even deteriorates with each stage. 
The share of Italy, France, Belgium, and Greece at the different infringement stages 
starts with an already staggering 49.4% of all the reasoned opinions of the EU 12 and 
57.1% of their ECJ referrals, only to reach 59.7% at the ECJ judgment stage and 
67.3% of the cases of delayed compliance with the first ECJ judgments.  
 
Having described and mapped this dependent variable, several questions arise: What 
explains the fact that some cases of non-compliance are settled at an early stage, 
while others drag on? Why do EU member states respond differently to the referral of 
their cases to the ECJ? How come that some member states shy away from conflict 
with the European Commission, while others do not even bother to comply with orders 
of the ECJ after being reprimanded twice – once for infringing on EU law and the sec-





2.2. Duration of Infringement Proceedings 
 
In regard to the second dependent variable, which measures the duration of infringe-
ment proceedings over time, we also find significant variation – not only between the 
member states. First, the length of proceedings varies between the official stages of 
the infringement proceedings. As can be seen in graph 3 below, we find enormous va-
riance in the length of individual cases even if we control for the number of stages 
these cases reach. The same holds true if we control for countries, policy sectors, or 
years. While some cases are settled within less than ten days, others go one for more 
than a decade. For obvious reasons, cases that reach later stages of the infringement 
proceedings last – on average – longer than the cases, which are settled at the Rea-
soned Opinion stage. Also, given that the number of infringements drops sharply form 
stage to stage (cf. graph 1), it is not surprising that the box plot for all the infringements 
looks pretty similar to those that are never referred to the ECJ. 
 











































If we focus on the second dependent variable from the member state perspective, we 
find that each member state has cases that have been settled quickly within less than 
one year after the Commission sent a reasoned opinion. Also, virtually all member 
states have instances in which non-compliance continued for multiple years. While the 
most extreme cases took place in Belgium, France, the UK, and Greece and required 
17.9, 14.8, 14.8, and 13.1 years to be settled, respectively, implementation leaders and 
laggards have their fair share of short-term and long running infringements (cf. graph 
4). 
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In terms of the average duration of non-compliance once the European Commission 
has opened infringement proceedings against a member state, Portugal is the com-
pliance leader (1.1 years of average duration), since the majority of its cases is settled 
much more quickly than those of the other member states. Particular long durations 




3. Theoretical Explanations 
 
In this section, we develop a number of hypotheses in order to explain cross-country 
variation in the prevalence of non-compliance between EU member states. The hypo-
theses are derived from the most prominent theoretical compliance approaches, i.e., 
enforcement, management, and legitimacy (cf. Börzel et al. 2007), and focus on our 
two dependent variables (persistence of non-compliance over time and across stages). 
Since our analysis on the occurrence of non-compliance has revealed strong interac-
tion effects, this section will additionally develop hypotheses on interactions between 
power and capacity, autonomy, and legitimacy, as well as between legitimacy and gov-
ernment autonomy for both variants of the dependent variable. 
 
3.1. Prevalence of Non-Compliance across the Stages of the Infringe-
ment Procedure 
 
The enforcement approach assumes that states as strategic rational actors violate in-
ternational law willingly, if compliance costs exceed its benefits (e.g. Martin 1992a; 
Fearon 1998; cf. Börzel et al. 2007). From the enforcement approach, we can derive 
two alternative hypotheses on power and non-compliance. On the one hand, powerful 
member states should be less sensitive to the costs that come with the prosecution of 
their established non-compliance cases. As they can be recalcitrant to sanctions, more 
stages of the infringement procedure should be needed until compliance is restored 
than is the case for infringements on European law by weaker member states. On the 
other hand, powerful member states can not only deter the EU’s enforcement authori-
ties – the Commission and the ECJ – from opening non-compliance proceedings, but 
also from pushing and escalating these proceedings once they have been started. As a 
consequence, we expect the infringement proceedings against powerful states to be 
settled at earlier stages than those against the less powerful ones. While we assume 
that the power of recalcitrance and the power of deterrence play an important role 
when it comes to the prevalence of non-compliance across the stages of the EU in-
fringement procedure, we do not expect to see any effects of the power of assertive-
ness to be present after the initial occurrence of non-compliance. Assertiveness affects 
the potential misfit of European legislation and whether member states comply or do 
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not comply with legal acts from Brussels. Yet, the assertiveness approach is not useful 
when we want to analyze the prevalence of non-compliance. 
 
Table 1: Enforcement Hypotheses 
Power of recalcitrance Power of deterrence 
The more powerful a state is, the more 
stages of the infringement procedure it 
takes until non-compliance is abolished.  
The more powerful a state is, the less 
stages of the infringement procedure it 
takes until non-compliance is abolished.  
 
One basic assumption of the management approach is that insufficient capacities of 
states bring about involuntary non-compliance (e.g. Chayes/Handler-Chayes 1993). 
From this approach, we can derive two hypotheses that are very similar to those de-
rived for the effects of government autonomy and capacity on the initial occurrence of 
non-compliance (cf. Börzel et al. 2007). First, since veto players can delay and/or block 
necessary decision for the settlement of infringement cases, we expect infringements 
of member states with many veto players – i.e., low levels of government autonomy – 
to take more stages of the infringement procedure until non-compliance is abolished. 
Second, if the governments of member states did not have the necessary capacity to 
prevent non-compliance in the first place, they might also struggle with overcoming it 
once it has been established by the Commission and/or the ECJ. Therefore, member 
states with few material resources and inefficient bureaucracies require more stages of 
the infringement procedure before they can transform non-compliance into compliance. 
 
Table 2: Management Hypotheses 
Government autonomy Government capacity 
The lower the level of government auton-
omy is, the more stages of the infringe-
ment procedure it takes until non-
compliance is abolished.  
The lower the level of government capaci-
ty is, the more stages of the infringement 
procedure it takes until non-compliance is 
abolished.  
 
A third source of alternative explanation for compliance dynamics are legitimacy ap-
proaches (cf. Börzel et al. 2007). If non-compliance is perceived as being less appro-
priate by member states with high levels of support for the principle of the rule of law 
once cases enter the judicial arena, it is obvious that these member states will do their 
best to settle their infringement cases at early stages of the infringement procedure, 
while states with a low salience for the rule of law could not care less. However, it is not 
only the support for the principle of the rule of law that should make a difference, but 
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also the support for the European Union itself and its institutions. Since member states 
with low public support for the EU feel less obliged to comply with EU law, their in-
fringements cases are dragged on over a larger number of stages of the infringement 
procedure. If the EU is respected as a rule-setting institution, member states will work 
hard to abolish non-compliance at early stages of the infringement procedure. 
 
Table 3: Legitimacy Hypotheses 
Rule of law Support for the EU 
The lower the level of support for the prin-
ciple of the rule of law is, the more stages 
of the infringement procedure it takes until 
non-compliance is abolished.  
The lower the level of public support for 
the EU as a rule-setting institution is, the 
more stages of the infringement proce-
dure it takes until non-compliance is ab-
olished.  
 
3.2. Prevalence of Non-Compliance over Time 
 
This section develops hypotheses on the effects of power, government capacity and 
autonomy, and support for the rule of law and the European Union on the temporal 
duration on non-compliance. To this end, this section draws once again on enforce-
ment, management, and legitimacy approaches. 
 
If member states have the power to be recalcitrant, it is only natural that they can take 
their time when it comes to transforming non-compliance into compliance. Therefore, it 
follows from the enforcement approach that it takes longer until compliance is restored 
when member states are involved that are less sensitive to costs imposed by sanctions 
than when member states are involved that are less powerful and therefore sensitive to 
these costs. While we expected that the effect of the power of deterrence on our first 
dependent variable are substantially different from those of the power of recalcitrance, 
i.e., recalcitrance leads to more cases and more cases at later stages of the infringe-
ment procedure, while deterrence prevents the European Commission form pressing 
charges in the first place and referring cases to the ECJ once infringement proceedings 
have been started, we expect the power of recalcitrance to have similar effects on the 
duration of the infringement proceedings as the power of deterrence. Recalcitrance 
increases the duration and so does deterrence. Because powerful member states deter 
enforcement authorities from pushing their infringement cases, these cases take longer 
to be resolved. As before, there is no hypothesis on the effect of the power of asser-
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tiveness on our dependent variable as the assertiveness approach is not useful when it 
comes to analyzing the prevalence of non-compliance. Assertiveness only matters for 
the occurrence of infringements in the first place. 
 
Table 4: Enforcement Hypotheses 
Power of recalcitrance Power of deterrence 
The more powerful a state is, the longer it 
takes until non-compliance is abolished.  
The more powerful a state is, the longer it 
takes until non-compliance is abolished. 
 
From the management approach, we derive the same two hypotheses as above. Both, 
government autonomy and capacity are supposed to be causally related to a speedy 
settlement of non-compliance cases. While veto players can delay and/or block neces-
sary decisions in the autonomy case, sufficient material resources and an efficient bu-
reaucracy can make a significant difference when it comes to transforming non-
compliance into compliance. 
 
Table 5: Management Hypotheses 
Government autonomy Government capacity 
The lower the level of government auton-
omy is, the longer it takes until non-
compliance is abolished. 
The lower the level of government capaci-
ty is, the longer it takes until non-
compliance is abolished. 
 
Since non-compliance is perceived as being less appropriate in member states that 
value the rule of law, we expect in line with the legitimacy approach that it takes less 
time to settle infringement cases in these states than in those that only mildly support 
the principle of the rule of law. Second, member states that feel obliged to comply with 
EU law due to their general support for European integration and the rule-setting insti-
tutions in Brussels are also expected to settle their cases as soon as possible. 
 
Table 6: Legitimacy Hypotheses 
Rule of law Support for the EU 
The lower the level of support for the prin-
ciple of the rule of law is, the longer it 
takes until non-compliance is abolished. 
The lower the level of public support for 
the EU as a rule-setting institution is, the 





3.3. Interaction Effects 
 
The compliance literature has been rather skeptical about combining management, 
enforcement, and legitimacy approaches because of their different assumptions re-
garding “how the international system works, the possibilities for governance with inter-
national law, and the policy tools that are available and should be used to handle im-
plementation problems” (Raustiala/Victor 1998: 681; cf. Raustiala/Slaughter 2002: 
543). Yet, empirical studies support explanations based on power, capacity, as well as 
legitimacy (Haas 1998; Mbaye 2001; Reinhardt 2001; Steinberg 2002; Mastenbroek 
2003, 2005; Steunenberg 2006). Likewise, the European Union and many international 
organizations use a combination of management, enforcement, and legitimacy me-
chanisms to induce member state compliance (Mitchell 1996; Tallberg 2002; 
Zürn/Joerges 2005). Combining explanatory factors of the different approaches makes 
not only empirically sense. Their theoretical assumptions are not always that incompat-
ible either (cf. Börzel et al. 2007). 
 
Power and Capacity 
 
The power of recalcitrance and capacities can interact in various ways. States with high 
powers of recalcitrance can afford to resist compliance more easily and are less in-
clined to restore compliance so as to avoiding that a particular infringement case is 
referred to the next stage. Capacity shortages hinder the transformation of non-
compliance into compliance. Structural deficits, such as an ineffective administration or 
a high number of veto players, cannot be easily evaded during ongoing infringement 
procedures. Hence, we expect that resource shortcomings and low government auton-
omy negatively affect states’ ability to restore compliance. Thus, it becomes increas-
ingly likely that the ECJ or the Commission take a case to the next stage of the in-
fringement procedure and that the overall duration of non-compliance increases: With 
increasing capacity, the positive effect of the power of recalcitrance on the continuation 
of non-compliance across the stages of the infringement procedure is reduced. While 
more power leads to more stages and longer periods of recalcitrance, this effect should 
be less pronounced for member states that have efficient bureaucracies.  
 
Even though one can envision capacity to interact with the power of deterrence, the 
causal story behind such an interaction is far-fetched. One would have to argue that 
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high government capacity and sufficient resources could make the threats of member 
states vis-à-vis enforcement authorities more credible. However, this is not very plausi-
ble and, therefore, we do not expect that capacity interacts with the power of deter-
rence in any of the two following ways. Neither does high government capacity rein-
force the negative effect of the power of deterrence on the number of stages reached 
before a settlement, nor does it reinforce the positive effect of the power of deterrence 
on the duration of non-compliance. While enforcement authorities might hesitate to 
transfer cases to subsequent stages and eventually enact penalties in response to 
member states’ power of deterrence, this effect is not conditional on the bureaucratic 
efficiency or financial resources of the threatening state.  
 
Finally, we already pointed out before that the power of assertiveness does not affect 
the number of stages or the length of time it takes until non-compliance is abolished. 
Consequently, we do not hypothesize interactions between the power of assertiveness 
and government capacity or autonomy, either. 
 
Table 7: Integrated Power and Capacity Hypotheses 
Stages:  Time:  
With increasing capacity, the positive ef-
fect of the power of recalcitrance on the 
number of stages of the infringement pro-
cedure it takes until non-compliance is 
abolished is reduced. 
With increasing capacity, the positive ef-
fect of the power of recalcitrance on the 
time it takes until non-compliance is ab-
olished is reduced. 
 
Power and Legitimacy 
 
On a first glance, combining enforcement and legitimacy approaches seems proble-
matic given that they are based on different theories of social action (cf. Börzel et al. 
2007). However, as powerful states can do as they please, what pleases them may 
well be defined by a normative logic that makes compliance the socially expected and 
accepted behavior – if their population is supportive of the rule of law and the EU, re-
spectively.  
 
As before, when we integrated power and capacity approaches, we do not draw on the 
power of deterrence or assertiveness for our integrated power and legitimacy hypothe-
sis. This is because the power of deterrence approach takes on the perspective of the 
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enforcement authority, and we can safely assume that the European Commission is 
not more or less deterred by a powerful member state depending on its support for the 
rule of law or support for the EU. Rather, lack in support might add ‘credibility’ to a 
member state’s recalcitrance. While this leads us to expect that with decreasing sup-
port for the rule of law and the EU, the positive effect of the power of recalcitrance of a 
member state to continue infringement cases is increased, it is not clear whether the 
European Commission would respond to such increased recalcitrance by pressing 
harder or shying away from conflict. What is clear, however, is that because support for 
the rule of law and support for the EU influences the cost sensitivity of a recalcitrant 
member state, that state is more inclined to settle infringements at an earlier stage. 
Similarly, since support for the rule of law and the EU can increase the cost sensitivity 
of a recalcitrant states, even powerful member state might be more inclined to settle 
infringement cases faster than they would do otherwise. 
 
Table 8: Integrated Power and Legitimacy Hypothesis 
Stages:  Time:  
With increasing support for the rule of law 
and the EU, the positive effect of the pow-
er of recalcitrance on the number of stag-
es of the infringement procedure it takes 
until non-compliance is abolished is re-
duced.  
With increasing support for the rule of law 
and the EU, the positive effect of the pow-
er of recalcitrance on the time it takes until 
non-compliance is abolished is reduced. 
 
Autonomy and Legitimacy 
 
Two final interaction effects concern the government autonomy and legitimacy. Even if 
governments prefer compliance, domestic veto players can slow down transposition 
and implementation processes. However, their inclination to do so might heavily de-
pend on the support for the rule of law and the public support for the EU they perceive. 
While low support means low legitimacy of the European Union and its legislative ac-
tivities, veto players can use low support justify their use of veto power before domestic 
elites and the general public, as well as the European Union and its institutions. Even if 
these audiences regard compliance as the appropriate course of action, low levels of 
support for the EU and the rule of law can provoke veto players to haven an even 
stronger impact on the duration of infringement proceedings and the number of stages 
of the infringement procedure it takes until non-compliance problems are resolved. 
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Table 9: Integrated Government Autonomy and Legitimacy Hypotheses 
Stages:  Time:  
With decreasing support for the rule of law 
and the EU, the negative effect of gov-
ernment autonomy on the number of 
stages of the infringement procedure it 
takes until non-compliance is abolished is 
reduced. 
With decreasing support for the rule of law 
and the EU, the negative effect of gov-
ernment autonomy on the time it takes 




4. Quantitative Analyses 
 
This section reports the results of our multivariate quantitative analysis. However, be-
fore we do so, we discuss the operationalization of our covariates in a first subsection. 
The second subsection focuses on the results for non-compliance over the stages of 
the infringement procedure, the third subsection tests the hypotheses on the persis-
tence of non-compliance over time, and the fourth and final subsection empirically 
analyses the interaction effects for both variants of the dependent variable. 
 
4.1. Operationalization and Data Sources 
 
To empirically test the hypotheses on the prevalence of non-compliance over the stag-
es of the EU infringement procedure and over time, we revert to the same independent 
variables that we successfully used to test the effects of power, capacity, and support 
on the relative number of infringements per member state, year, and legal act, i.e., on 
the occurrence of non-compliance, in our previous analyses (cf. Börzel et al. 2007).  
 
In order to test the influence of both relevant forms of power (i.e., recalcitrance and 
deterrence), we incorporate two power indicators into our analysis. These indicators 
are widely used in the literature and account for different aspects of power – economic 
size and EU-specific political power. Gross domestic product (‘GDP’) is our proxy for 
economic power (Keohane 1989; Martin 1992b; Moravcsik 1998; Steinberg 2002). The 
data come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005). For direct EU-
specific political power, we use the proportion of times when a member state is pivotal 
(and can, thus, turn a losing into a winning coalition) under qualified majority voting 
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(QMV) in the Council of Ministers (‘Shapley Shubik Index’) as an indicator (Shap-
ley/Shubik 1954; Rodden 2002).  
 
Government autonomy is a function of the number of veto players in the political sys-
tem of a member state (Immergut 1998; Tsebelis 2002). However, even if the number 
of the institutional and partisan veto players remains constant over time, the interests of 
these actors – for example regarding (non-) compliance – may change. Therefore, we 
use an alternative veto player index (‘Constraints’), which allows for the interests of 
veto players in such a way that interdependences between veto players and the re-
spective political system are taken into consideration (Henisz 2002). It is based on a 
simple spatial model of political interaction among government branches, measuring 
the number of independent branches with veto power and the distribution of political 
preferences across these branches. They can be interpreted as a measure of institu-
tional constraints that either preclude arbitrary changes of existing policies or produce 
gridlock and so undermine the ability of the government to change policies when such 
change is needed.3 Two alternative indicators of government autonomy are discussed 
in the literature: the executive control of the parliamentary agenda measured by the 
extent to which the government can successfully initiate drafts and rely on stable ma-
jorities for in the legislative branch, (Döring 1995; Tsebelis 2002) and the parliamentary 
oversight of government measured by the material (e.g. number of committees) and 
ideational resources (e.g. information processing capacity) relevant for the oversight of 
the legislative on the government (Harfst/Schnapp 2003). We do not include these two 
variables, because of multicollinearity concerns.  
 
To test for the influence of government capacity, we include two indicators that are 
prominent in the literature. First of all, we incorporate ‘GDP per capita’ (Brautigam 
1996). It is a general measure for the resources on which a state can draw to ensure 
compliance. The data come from the Word Development Indicators (World Bank 2005). 
Whether a state has the capacity to mobilize these resources shall be captured by the 
variable bureaucratic ‘Efficiency’. In the operationalization, we use an index of bureau-
cratic efficiency and professionalism of the public service based on work by Auer and 
                                                
 
3  Some scholars argue that political variables, such as partisan preferences of the governments in 
power, can explain variation in compliance with EU law (e.g. Mastenbroek 2005). This explanatory 
variable can be operationalized with the frequency of government changes. However, if partisan pref-
erences do matter, it is more likely that they account for variation in compliance between specific poli-
cies than for variation between countries 
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her colleagues (Auer et al. 1996; Mbaye 2001). This index consists of three compo-
nents of bureaucratic efficiency: performance related pay for civil servants, lack of per-
manent tenure, and public advertising of open positions. Bureaucratic efficiency highly 
correlates with measures of corruption, e.g. the Corruption Perception Index of Trans-
parency International (Herzfeld/Weiss 2003). For issues of multicollinearity, we include 
only bureaucratic efficiency in our analysis. Other potential indicators of government 
capacity – such as bureaucratic quality from the International Country Risk Guide and 
the World Bank governance indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2006) – are not used due to 
the fact that they cover only part of the time period analyzed in this paper and lack suf-
ficient variance for comparative studies of the EU member states. 
 
In principle, the operationalization of the rule of law hypothesis is unproblematic, since 
the extent of the support for the rule of law can be quantified on the basis of opinion 
poll data. Yet, good data are rare. We use James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira’s 
opinion poll survey data, even though the authors only retrieved data at one point in 
time, 1992-93 (Gibson/Caldeira 1996). The data measure the extent of support for the 
‘Rule of law’ on the basis of agreement with the following statements: “it is not neces-
sary to obey a law which I consider unfair”, “sometimes it is better to ignore a law and 
to directly solve problems instead of awaiting legal solution,” as well as “if I do not 
agree with a rule, it is okay to violate it as long as I pay attention to not being discov-
ered.” Alternative indicators used in the rule of law literature include the ‘law and order 
tradition’, as it is best known from the International Country Risk Guide, provided by the 
World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2003). However, not only does it not cover the full 1978-
99 time period, but leads to virtually identical results as the Gibson and Caldeira meas-
ure of the support for the rule of law if employed in our empirical analysis. Data on pub-
lic ‘EU support’ are available from Eurobarometer surveys. The acceptance of Euro-
pean institutions can be quantified by the question which refers to the support of the 







4.2. Results for Non-compliance across Stages of the Infringement Pro-
cedure 
 
Even though the discussion of the six enforcement, management, and legitimacy hypo-
theses on the prevalence of non-compliance over the stages of the EU infringement 
procedure only mentions the number of stages of the infringement proceedings (see 
3.1.), there actually are several alternative operationalizations of this first dependent 
variable. All these operationalizations are covered in our empirical findings in table 10. 
First, whether cases are settled at earlier or later stages of the procedure affects the 
number of cases at the consecutive stages of the infringement procedure. Therefore, 
our first operationalization, which we use for models 1-3 in table 10, measures the rela-
tive number of referrals to the ECJ according to Article 226 and 228 ECT, respectively, 
and the relative number of ECJ rulings per member state and year. Second, whether 
cases make it to later stages affects how many percent of the cases from a preceding 
stage are actually referred to the next one. Therefore, our second operationalization, 
which we use for models 4-6 in table 10, measures exactly these percentages. Third, 
we can directly measure the number of stages that it takes for specific infringement 
cases to be settled. We use this operationalization for model 7 in table 10. The different 
operationalizations imply the use of different estimation techniques (OLS for models 1-
6 versus ordered probit for model 7 in table 10) as well as units of analysis (country 
years for models 1-6 versus individual infringement cases for model 7 in table 10). 
 
Table 10: Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements 








Power:    
GDP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Shapley Shubik Index 0.0134*** 0.0057 0.0009* 
 -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0004 
Capacity:    
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GDPpc 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Efficiency -0.1152** -0.0469* -0.0064 
 -0.0392 -0.024 -0.0045 
Constraints 0.0974 0.0652 0.0426 
 -0.0864 -0.0713 -0.0255 
Legitimacy:    
Rule of law 0.0015 0.0011 0.0001 
 -0.0043 -0.0027 -0.0005 
EU support 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0001 
Constant 0.0054 0.0314 -0.0049 
 -0.0449 -0.0241 -0.0044 
Year dummies yes yes yes 
Observations 233 233 233 
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.24 0.12 
Regressions with two-tailed t-tests and robust (Huber-White) standard errors with clus-
tering on member states. *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1. 
 
For the relative number of ECJ referrals and rulings, we can see a very similar picture 
as for the relative number of Reasoned Opinions per member state and year (cf. Börzel 
et al. 2007). What matters whether member states have more or less non-compliance 
cases at the later stages of the EU infringement procedure are bureaucratic efficiency 
and voting power. While capacity matters for the first ECJ referrals and rulings in the 
hypothesized way, EU specific political power has the correct sign, but is only signifi-
cant at the first and second ECJ referral stages. Hence, even though the overall model 
fit becomes smaller from stage to stage, models 1-3 in table 10 overall suggest that (i) 
the more political power a member states has, the more recalcitrant it is to settle cases 
at an early stage and (ii) the more efficient the bureaucracy of a member state works, 
the fewer of its non-compliance cases make it to the later stages. Legitimacy, by con-
trast, does not influence whether cases are settled early or make it to the later stages. 
Neither EU support nor the extent to which the rule of law is institutionalized matter for 
compliance dynamics. 
 
These regression results are very much in line with the observation that for instance 
Italy, with its limited capacity and strong political power of recalcitrance, is a com-
pliance laggard across all stages of the infringement procedure. Greece, Belgium, and 
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France are compliance laggards as well. While the power to be recalcitrant is limited in 
Greece and Belgium, both suffer from capacity shortcomings due to inefficient bureau-
cracies. France, on the other hand, can afford to continue non-compliance due to its 
EU specific power. Denmark and the Netherlands are compliance leaders across all 
infringement stages. As predicted by our hypotheses, both countries combine high 
government capacity with low power of recalcitrance. 
 
Table 10: Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements (continued) 
Models: (4) (5) (6) (7) 




Make it to 
ECJ Rulings 
(Art. 226) 






Power:     
GDP -0.0004 0.0002 0.0008*** 0.0001** 
 -0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0003 -0.0001 
Shapley Shubik Index 0.3862 0.3224 0.0243 -0.0095 
 -0.3726 -0.5022 -0.0538 -0.0097 
Capacity:     
GDPpc 0.0004* 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000** 
 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Efficiency -9.4795** -1.5957 -0.5126 -0.2717*** 
 -3.2258 -2.4852 -0.3734 -0.0549 
Constraints 13.5642* 14.074 4.6195 0.3702* 
 -7.5468 -8.3426 -3.5487 -0.1907 
Legitimacy:     
Rule of law 0.1906 0.1449 0.0018 0.0078* 
 -0.3373 -0.2805 -0.0368 -0.0045 
EU support -0.0309 -0.0023 0.0176 0.0022 
 -0.1056 -0.0657 -0.0127 -0.0019 
Constant 23.1003*** 18.1363** -0.2471  
 -6.9152 -6.5118 -0.3105  
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Cut point 1    0.6207*** 
    -0.1759 
Cut point 2    1.1580*** 
    -0.1768 
Cut point 3    2.1619*** 
    -0.1777 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Observations 233 233 233 5,181 
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.01 0.12  
 
Now, when we look at the percentage of cases that are carried over from one stage to 
the following stage, the findings are less pronounced, but, at least in model 4 in table 
10, we find a significant and negative effect for efficiency. The more efficient a member 
state’s bureaucracy, the less infringement cases make it from the Reasoned Opinion to 
the ECJ referral (Article 226) stage. In line with this finding, very efficient states, such 
as Denmark, settle more cases at earlier stages than states with inefficient bureaucra-
cies, such as Belgium, Greece, France, or Italy. For the following stages, we still see a 
negative algebraic sign for efficiency – and a positive sign for the Shapley Shubik In-
dex, for that matter – in line with our predictions, but the coefficients lack significance. 
 
As expected, the number of domestic veto players positively influences the percentage 
of cases that are carried on. However, this effect is only significant for the move from 
the first to the second stage (model 4, table 10). Non-compliance cases of states with 
many domestic veto players, such as Germany and Belgium, are more likely to be re-
ferred to the ECJ than in states with more government autonomy, such as Ireland or 
Luxembourg. After the first infringement stage, the negative effect of veto players on 
compliance disappears because veto players tend to delay transposition processes, 
while negotiating compromises, but rarely block compliance altogether.  
 
The last column of table 10 shows the findings of an ordered probit estimation of the 
effects of the dependent variables on the probability that a specific case reaches one of 
the stages of the infringement procedure. Therefore, our units of analysis are not the 
233 country years anymore, but 5,181 individual infringement cases. As we can see, 
member states’ bureaucratic efficiency makes a difference once again. Non-
compliance cases from highly efficient member states, such as Denmark, the Nether-
lands, or the UK, are far less likely to make it to the later stages than those from their 
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less efficient European counterparts, such as Greece or Italy. This strongly supports 
our government capacity hypothesis. Also, there is some support for the other capacity 
hypothesis: Member states with many veto players find it obviously harder to settle 
their non-compliance cases at early stages of the infringement procedure, which in-
creases the probability that these cases make it to subsequent stages. Another signifi-
cant variable is the rule of law. However, other than expected, more support for the rule 
of law seems to lead to a significantly higher share of cases carried on to subsequent 
stages. This counterintuitive finding cannot be easily explained. Also the rule of law 
variable is not significant in any of the other models (cf. models 1-6 in table 10).  
 
Overall, we find evidence for the hypotheses that we derived from the management 
approach to compliance – more so for the effect of bureaucratic efficiency than that of 
veto players, but ultimately of both. Especially settlements at early stages of the EU 
infringement procedure seem to be driven by capacity. At the same time, we also find 
some support for the positive effect of the power of recalcitrance, but none for the neg-
ative one of the power of deterrence. Last, but not least, legitimacy variables do not 
cause member states to shy away from the ECJ or settle their infringement cases 
quickly. 
 
4.3. Results for Non-compliance over Time 
 
To test the effects of power, capacity, and legitimacy on the duration of non-
compliance, we use the same independent variables as before, when we were testing 
their effects on the prevalence of non-compliance over the stages of the infringement 
procedure. However, our dependent variable is different. It measures the time it takes a 
specific instance of non-compliance to be settled in days. This operationalization of the 
dependent variable makes the use of a different statistical method necessary: survival 
analysis. Survival models (Cox Proportional Hazard Models) look at how many days 
individual cases survive until they finally ‘die’. In other words, we analyze how long it 
takes these cases from Reasoned Opinion to termination. In table 11, we test whether 
power, capacity, and legitimacy make an early ‘death’ more probable or not.  
 
In this simple regression without interaction effects, the coefficients for political power 
(Shapley Shubik Index), government capacity, and legitimacy have the expected alge-
braic signs, but are not significantly different from zero. For capacity, this could be the 
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case because – in principle – once infringements reach the ECJ, all member states 
should have the necessary capacities to correctly transpose, implement, and enforce 
EU law. If member states run into capacity shortcomings, they should theoretically be 
able to redistribute resources internally and push their bureaucracies to focus their ef-
forts on prioritized cases. In particular, since only a few cases are usually in front of the 
ECJ at any given time, even poor and bureaucratically inefficient EU member states 
should be in a position to domestically reallocate financial means or administrative at-
tention and support once it comes to judicial discourses, judgments, and the threat of 
sanctions. Still, if one peeps at the empirical findings reported in the next subsection, 
one can clearly see that bureaucratic efficiency plays a significant role in the context of 
compliance dynamics. In other words, it is too early to write off the importance of gov-
ernment capacity at this point. 
 
Table 11: Duration and Survival 
 Duration  
Power:   
GDP 0.0000  
 -0.0001  
Shapley Shubik Index -0.0133  
 -0.0097  
Capacity:   
GDPpc 0.0000  
 0.0000  
Efficiency 0.0455  
 -0.0454  
Constraints -0.3667*  
 -0.1903  
Legitimacy:   
Rule of law -0.0017  
 -0.0039  
EU support -0.002  
 -0.0017  
Year dummies yes  
Observations 4,377  
Time at risk 2,905,849  
Regressions with two-tailed t-tests and robust (Huber-White) standard errors with clus-
tering on member states. *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1. 
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Only government autonomy seems to have the predicted effect in table 11. That is, 
veto players prevent a quick settlement of non-compliance cases and cause the longer 
duration of the non-compliance cases of such member states as Italy, Germany, and 
Belgium (cf. graph 4). We have seen similar results in models 4 and 7 of table 10. How 
come that veto players make a difference for the duration and persistence of non-
compliance, but has been shown to have no significant effect on its occurrence (Börzel 
et al. 2007)? One way to interpret this finding is that veto players might find it hard to 
exert their influence across the board in an anti-compliance way, but can employ their 
veto powers in the specific and focused cases that make it to the later stages of the 
official infringement proceedings. By denying their approval to specific new European 
legislation, they significantly contribute to the dragging on of non-compliance cases. 
 
4.4. Results for the Interaction Effects 
 
We test our integrated hypotheses using the same models estimated in the previous 
section, but augment them by the hypothesized interaction effects between the power, 
capacity, government autonomy, and legitimacy variables. What do we find? 
 
When we take a look at the effects of power, capacity, and legitimacy on the relative 
number of infringements at the later stages of the infringement procedure in table 12, 
models 1-9, we find strong and consistent support for our power of recalcitrance and 
government capacity hypotheses, but only mixed or next to no support for the two legi-
timacy hypotheses. At the ECJ referral stage, Article 226 ECT, the ECJ ruling stage, 
and the second ECJ referral stage, Article 228 ECT, voting power in the Council of Mi-
nister is significantly and positively correlated with the relative number of non-
compliance cases (cf. models 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in table 12), while bureaucratic effi-
ciency has the reverse effect, i.e., member states with better bureaucracies have view-
er infringements at all stages of the infringement procedure (cf. models 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 
and 9 in table 12). However, only at the first ECJ referral stage, the hypothesized inte-
raction effect between power and bureaucratic efficiency is supported, i.e., increasing 
government capacity reduces the positive effect of the power of recalcitrance on the 
number of cases at each stage. For powerful states with high bureaucratic efficiency, 
such as the UK, the power of recalcitrance matters less. Due to their high government 
capacity, they face lower compliance costs in general and, therefore, feel the urge to 
employ their political power less often. However, if compliance costs are relatively high 
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for individual cases, states are more inclined to make use of their power of recalci-
trance and hesitate to settle them early, regardless of their bureaucratic capacities. 
 
Table 12: Integrated Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements 









Power:      
GDP 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Shapley Shubik Index 0.0127*** 0.0183***  0.0057*
 -0.0034 -0.0045  -0.003 
Capacity:     
GDPpc 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000
 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Efficiency -0.1023***  -0.1761*** -0.0381***
 -0.011  0.0521 -0.007 
Constraints 0.0772  -0.0453 0.0594
 -0.109  0.1340 -0.0741 
Legitimacy:     
Rule of law  -0.0058** 0.0081  
  -0.0024 0.0051  
EU support  0.0026** -0.0009  
  -0.0012 0.0015  
Interaction Effects:     
SS Index * Efficiency -0.0043**   -0.0023
 -0.0018   -0.0015 
SS Index * Rule of law  0.0004   
  -0.0005   
SS Index * EU support  0.0005*   
  -0.0003   
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Const. * Rule of law   0.0133  
   0.0147  
Const. * EU support   0.0055  
   0.0032  
Constant 0.0147 0.0455 0.0054 0.0368
 -0.0429 -0.0474 0.0395 -0.0235 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 233 233 233 233
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.26
Regressions with two-tailed t-tests and robust (Huber-White) standard errors with clus-
tering on member states. *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1. 
 
The coefficients for the support of the European Union turn out to be only significant 
when we do not control for government capacity (cf. models 1, 5, and 8 versus 3, 6, 
and 9 in table 12). Also, they have all the wrong algebraic sign. While our hypotheses 
ask for a non-compliance reducing effect of support, we find an increasing one. The 
counter-intuitive finding and the lack of robustness can be explained by a strong direct 
and negative relation between the covariates capacity and legitimacy, which leads to 
the positive, albeit spurious correlation between EU support and non-compliance that 
we observe if we do not control for bureaucratic efficiency. The literature has found that 
support for the EU and the rule of law, respectively, are directly linked to a lack of state 
capacity. Citizens of states with weak capacities show low support for the rule of law 
since domestic legislation is hardly enforced (Putnam 1993; Levi 1998; Tyler 1998). 
They turn to the EU as an institution that may be more effective in providing public 
goods (Lampinen/Uusikylä 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). As a consequence, those 
member states most supportive of the EU can be among the worst compliers. Even if 
the EU produces rules for the provision of public goods, these member states still lack 
the capacity to effectively implement them on the ground. This finding is corroborated 
by IR scholars, who argue that states have an incentive to delegate authority to interna-
tional institutions to achieve policy outcomes that cannot be realized at the domestic 
level due to powerful veto players or lacking resources (Keohane/Nye 1977; Ruggie 
1983; Keohane 1984; Putnam 1988; Simmons/Martin 1998; Simmons 2002). In es-
sence, if government capacity and EU support measure the same underlying concept, 
the coefficients of public support for the EU and the significant and positive interaction 
effects between the Shapley Shubik Index and support (cf. models 2, 5, and 8 in graph 
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12) actually give additional support to our argument that power and capacity are inter-
related with respect to the occurrence and continuation – across stages and time – of 
non-compliance. 
 
Overall, models 1-12 in table 12 clearly point to the importance of power and capacity 
at all stages of the official infringement proceedings. On average, member states with 
many votes in the Council and inefficient bureaucracies at home feature significantly 
more Reasoned Opinions, ECJ Referrals (Article 226 and 228 ECT), as well as ECJ 
Rulings. These findings are extremely robust. At the same time, we find only mixed 
evidence for an influence of legitimacy on non compliance. The empirical findings for 
the effects of public support for the EU and its institutions as well as the rule of law are 
counterintuitive and weak at best. 
 
Table 12: Integrated Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements (continued) 









Power:      
GDP 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000
 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Shapley Shubik Index 0.0085***  0.0010* 0.0011*
 -0.0028  -0.0005 -0.0005 
Capacity:     
GDPpc  0.0000 0.0000  
  0.0000 0.0000  
Efficiency  -0.0766** -0.0067***  
  0.0290 -0.0015  
Constraints  -0.0200 0.0436*  
  0.0879 -0.0232  
Legitimacy:     
Rule of law -0.0018 0.0043  -0.0002
 -0.0013 0.0030  -0.0003 
EU support 0.0012* -0.0004  0.0003**
 -0.0006 0.0006  -0.0001 
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Interaction Effects:     
SS Index * Efficiency   -0.0001  
   -0.0003  
SS Index * Rule of 
law 
0.0003   0.0001
 -0.0003   -0.0001 
SS Index * EU sup-
port 
0.0003**   0.0001***
 -0.0001   0.0000 
Const. * Rule of law  0.0044   
  0.0088   
Const. * EU support  0.0018   
  0.0029   
Constant 0.0467 0.0296 -0.005 -0.0036
 -0.0268 0.0220 -0.0036 -0.0037 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 233 233 233 233
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.12
 
Table 12: Integrated Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements (continued) 
















Power:      
GDP  -0.0009 -0.0003  
  -0.0015 -0.0034  
Shapley Shubik Index  0.5756* 0.5502  
  -0.3197 -0.4144  
Capacity:     
GDPpc 0.0000 0.0004*  0.0005*
 0.0000 -0.0002  0.0002 
Efficiency -0.0115* -7.5189***  -11.5311***
 0.0061 -0.8769  3.4727 
Constraints 0.0207 16.6171**  10.2234
 0.0240 -7.6184  9.5474 
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Legitimacy:     
Rule of law 0.0007  -0.4118 0.4078
 0.0006  -0.247 0.3102 
EU support 0.0001  0.1858 -0.0754
 0.0002  -0.1248 0.1235 
Interaction Effects:     
SS Index * Efficiency  0.0201   
  -0.1553   
SS Index * Rule of law   -0.0103  
   -0.0404  
SS Index * EU support   0.0083  
   -0.0213  
Const. * Rule of law -0.0012   1.0410
 0.0023   0.8232 
Const. * EU support -0.0001   0.4181
 0.0007   0.5215 
Constant -0.0056 23.6211*** 26.7154*** 22.8982***
 0.0048 -7.3551 -8.0448 6.4262 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 233 233 233 233
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15
 
Now, if we shift our attention to the second operationalization of our second dependent 
variable, i.e., the percentage of infringements that are passed on to subsequent stages 
(models 10-18 in table 12), we find relatively strong support for separate effects of bu-
reaucratic efficiency, but also some for government autonomy, and the power of recal-
citrance – especially in the models 10, 12, 16, and 18 of table 12. This is in line with the 
empirical finding that states with high capacities and low power, such as Denmark, tend 
to settle cases at earlier stages, while powerful states with limited capacities, such as 
Italy, tend to carry cases to later stages of the EU infringement procedure. However, 
there is no indication for a significant and negative power-capacity interaction effect. 
Also, none of the other hypothesized interaction effects is supported by the empirical 
evidence in models 10-18 of table 12. 
 
Model 17 of table 12 seems to lend additional support to the recalcitrance hypothesis. 
In this case, economic power correlates positively with the percentage of cases that are 
carried on to the next stage. However, this finding is not robust. The same holds true 
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for the somewhat counter intuitive finding for GDP per capita, which – as an indicator 
for capacity in terms of financial resources – points in the wrong direction in two of the 
models (cf. models 10 and 12) of table 12. Similarly, support for European integration is 
significant in only one single model. As before, the coefficient does not have the hy-
pothesized sign, but rather supports our argument about the link between capacity and 
support. Overall, it becomes clear that as we move to the later stages of the infringe-
ment procedure, all our models become less stable, which is at least partly due to 
technical reasons, i.e., the reduction of variation on the dependent variable from stage 
to stage, which, in essence, makes non-compliance less predictable. Therefore, it is 
not too surprising that none of our interaction terms turns out to be significant in the 
hypothesized way. 
 
Table 12: Integrated Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements (continued) 
Models: (13) (14) (15) (16)
 Make it to 
ECJ Rulings 
(Art. 226) 
Make it to 
ECJ Rulings 
(Art. 226) 
Make it to 
ECJ Rulings 
(Art. 226) 




Power:      
GDP -0.0002 -0.0005  0.0007***
 -0.0022 -0.0029  -0.0002 
Shapley Shubik Index 0.3543 0.3846  0.0559
 -0.3668 -0.4754  -0.0381 
Capacity:     
GDPpc 0.0000  0.0001 0.0000
 -0.0001  0.0002 0.0000 
Efficiency -0.2331  -3.4350 -0.6878***
 -0.6953  2.2784 -0.1106 
Constraints 14.1372  8.3804 5.1792*
 -8.5129  9.1532 -2.7272 
Legitimacy:     
Rule of law  0.0272 0.3533  
  -0.1608 0.2443  
EU support  0.0481 -0.0389  
  -0.061 0.0620  
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Interaction Effects:     
SS Index * Efficiency -0.2107   0.0509*
 -0.1404   -0.0266 
SS Index * Rule of law  -0.027   
  -0.034   
SS Index * EU support  0.0028   
  -0.0193   
Const. * Rule of law   0.4539  
   0.9219  
Const. * EU support   -0.2013  
   0.5038  
Constant 18.7966** 19.2334** 18.1748** -0.3855
 -6.6061 -6.8635 6.3377 -0.2213 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 233 233 233 233
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12
 
Table 12: Integrated Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements (continued) 
Models: (17) (18) (19) (20)
 Make it to ECJ 
Referrals 
(Art. 228) 







Power:      
GDP 0.0004  0.0001*** 0.0001
 -0.0004  0.0000 0.0001 
Shapley Shubik 
Index 
0.0588  0.0038 0.0043
 -0.0657  0.0025 0.0123 
Capacity:     
GDPpc  0.0000 0.0000***  
  0.0000 0.0000  
Efficiency  -0.8912* -0.2282***  
  0.4710 0.0137  
Constraints  1.7765 0.4937***  
  2.7611 0.0154  
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Legitimacy:     
Rule of law -0.0261 0.0375  -0.0056
 -0.0257 0.0486  0.0070 
EU support 0.0322*** 0.0122  0.0083**
 -0.01 0.0142  0.0034 
Interaction Effects:     
SSI * Efficiency   0.0006  
   0.0022  
SSI * Rule of law 0.0044   -0.0004
 -0.0054   0.0010 
SSI * EU support 0.0039**   0.0001
 -0.0013   0.0004 
Const. * Rule of 
law 
 -0.4023   
  0.2603   
Const. * EU sup-
port 
 0.0123   
  0.0987   
Constant -0.1822 -0.4589   
 -0.2812 0.4019   
Cut point 1   6.1634*** 0.4644*
   0.0093 0.2627 
Cut point 2   6.7003*** 0.9988***
   0.0068 0.2634 
Cut point 3   7.7037*** 1.9988***
   0.0054 0.2858 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 233 233 5,181 5,181
Adjusted R-
squared 










Table 12: Integrated Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements (continued) 
Models: (21) (22) (23) (24)
 Number of 
Stages 
Duration Duration Duration
Power:      
GDP  -0.0000 -0.0000  
  0.0001 0.0001  
Shapley Shubik Index  -0.0214*** -0.0113  
  0.0080 0.0112  
Capacity:     
GDPpc 0.0000** -0.0000  -0.0000*
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Efficiency -0.2778*** 0.0546***  0.1007
 0.0726 0.0180  0.0713 
Constraints 0.2712 -0.3853*  0.0209
 0.2341 0.2149  0.1813 
Legitimacy:     
Rule of law 0.0111  -0.0013 -0.0071
 0.0072  0.0036 0.0060 
EU support 0.0003  -0.0037* -0.0021
 0.0025  0.0020 0.0036 
Interaction Effects:     
SSI * Efficiency  -0.0044   
  0.0048   
SSI * Rule of law   0.0003  
   0.0009  
SSI * EU support   -0.0002  
   0.0002  
Const. * Rule of law 0.0288   0.0271
 0.0338   0.0250 
Const. * EU support 0.0157   -0.0048
 0.0239   0.0169 
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Cut point 1 0.6755***    
 0.2106    
Cut point 2 1.2124***    
 0.2171    
Cut point 3 2.2148***    
 0.2374    
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,181 4,377 4,377 4,377
Time at risk  2,905,849 2,905,849 2,905,849
 
Models 19-21 of table 12 turn our attention to the third and final operationalization of 
our first dependent variable. Do power, capacity, and legitimacy determine at which 
stage individual infringement cases are settled? It is obvious that government capacity 
and, to a lesser extent, government autonomy matter. Infringements, which are com-
mitted by member states with efficient bureaucracies and few veto players, are settled 
at earlier stages of the infringement procedure. By contrast, states with inefficient bu-
reaucracies and many veto players, such as Belgium and Italy, carry many cases on to 
later stages of the infringement procedure (cf. graph 2). However, our empirical find-
ings do not support the idea of interactive effects – neither between power and capaci-
ty, nor of the any of the other hypothesized combinations.  
 
Last, but not least, we analyze the predictive quality of our theoretical models for the 
duration of non-compliance (cf. models 22-24 in table 12). We find some support for 
the power of deterrence and recalcitrance and the capacity hypotheses. Infringements 
take longer for more powerful states, while cases are quickly settled for states with high 
capacities. Again, the findings for support of the EU and the rule of law do not support 
the legitimacy hypotheses. More support for the EU seems even to increase the 
amount of time it takes before cases can be resolved (cf. model 23 in table 12). While 
this finding is counter intuitive, it fits in very well with the findings of models 2, 5, 8, 17, 
and 20 in table 12, which all highlight that support for European integration goes hand 
in hand with later settlements. As argued above, this can be explained by the fact that 
citizens in states with weak government capacities tend to shift their support to the EU 
level, so that these states have high EU support rates, but, at the same time, lack the 
capacities to transpose, implement, apply, and enforce European law, which brings 
about the long duration of non-compliance. Finally, all our interactive hypotheses have 
to be rejected. At least for the duration of non-compliance, there is no significant inte-
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raction effect between power and capacity, power and legitimacy, or government au-





Why do some member states shy away from conflict with the European Commission 
while others do not even bother to comply with orders of the ECJ after being convicted 
twice – once for infringing on EU law (article 226 ECT) and the second time for not 
concurring with the court’s first judgment (article 228 ECT)? We inquired to what extent 
power, capacity, and legitimacy approaches to norm violations and compliance, which 
explain a country’s number of prosecuted violations at the first formal stage of the in-
fringement proceedings, can also account for the number of court referrals and judg-
ments. Are non-compliance settlement dynamics guided by the same set of variables 
as the occurrence of norm violations? We analyzed whether power, capacity and legi-
timacy influence why some infringement proceedings are settled faster and at an earli-
er stage than others. The paper proceeded in two major steps. First, we developed 
separate and integrated hypotheses on the effects of power, capacity, and legitimacy 
on the time and the number of stages of the EU infringement procedure it takes to set-
tle infringements and restore compliance with European law. Second, we extensively 
tested these hypotheses with quantitative methods.  
 
Our findings are very much in line with the enforcement and management approaches’ 
predictions on the effect of power of recalcitrance and, especially, government capaci-
ty. The analyses clearly show that high bureaucratic efficiency and, to a lesser extent, a 
low number of domestic veto players help member states to avoid and overcome invo-
luntary forms of non-compliance. At the same time, the power of recalcitrance can en-
able member states to sit out long and escalating infringement proceedings. While the 
combined power and capacity model seems strong and both capacity and power have 
their significant effects on non-compliance across time and the stages of the infringe-
ment procedure, the explanatory power of our model declines somewhat the further we 
move towards the end of the EU infringement procedure.  
 
What about our other hypotheses beyond capacity and power of recalcitrance? While 
the power of recalcitrance is an important predictor for compliance settlement dynam-
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ics, the power of deterrence cannot explain why some states tend to settle cases early 
– like Portugal and the UK – while others wait until the later stages (e.g. Italy and Bel-
gium). Legitimacy does not crucially influence whether states shy away from the ECJ or 
not. While the support for the rule of law tends to have the correct, positively algebraic 
sigh, it is not significant. By contrast, the support for the EU sometimes seem to have a 
significant influence, but points into another direction than expected by our hypothesis. 
Apparently, high support for the EU correlates with later rather than early settlements. 
This mirrors the finding for the occurrence of non-compliance. There, we convincingly 
showed that the counter intuitive link between infringements and support for Europe is 
spurious (cf. Börzel et al. 2007).  
 
Coming back to our initial question of why some member states tend to shy away from 
conflict with the Commission, while others can only be forced into compliance by ECJ 
judgments and the threat of sanctions, the answer is simple: states with efficient bu-
reaucracies and few constraints on government autonomy can more easily overcome 
involuntary forms of non-compliance and tend to settle cases at early stages. At the 
same time, states with higher shares of power can afford to be recalcitrant, carry cases 
to the ECJ, and risk adverse ECJ judgments or even Article 228 proceedings. There-
fore, states combining high capacities with low power, such as Denmark and the Neth-
erlands, are compliance leaders across the stages of the infringement procedure. Con-
versely, states that lack capacities, while being politically relevant in the EU, are com-
pliance laggards across the EU infringement procedures.   
 
Do some member states give in quickly while others inhibit the effectiveness of Euro-
pean law for a much longer time? Again, the answer is that capacity and the power of 
recalcitrance are crucial predictors (cf. especially model 22 in table 12). However, if we 
take an even closer look at the duration of non-compliance, we can also see that, be-
sides capacity and the power of recalcitrance, the power of deterrence becomes impor-
tant. The more powerful member states are, the longer is the average overall duration 
of the proceeding and the longer it takes until cases are resolved. This is not only in 
line with recalcitrance, but also with the power of deterrence explanation. A deterred 
European Commission refrains from pressing ahead with legal proceedings thereby 
prolonging the duration of non-compliance. In essence, restoring compliance takes 
longer for more powerful member states. At the same time, member states with high 
government autonomy and efficient bureaucracies settle their cases faster. Therefore, 
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the slowest states are powerful and have limited capacities, and member states, which 
combine low political weight with high capacities, such as Portugal or the states that 
joined the EU in 1995, manage to keep their infringement proceedings relatively short.  
 
Overall, we do not find conclusive support for our integrated, interactive hypotheses. 
While power and capacity matter individually for the duration of non-compliance and 
number of stage it takes for infringements to be resolved, they hardly affect each other 
in their relations to our two dependent variables. Similarly, none of the other tested 
interaction effects of power and legitimacy and government autonomy and legitimacy 
produced any robust results. On the one hand, this speaks for a straight forward model 
to explain variation on the dependent variables. On the other hand, our findings and the 
non-stellar fit of the simple power and capacity model also show that we have to in-
clude non-country related factors in future research. These factors should play an im-
portant role with respect to the time and the number of stages it takes to settle specific 
cases of non-compliance. While preliminary tests with policy effects clearly indicate that 
policy matters, future research still has to pinpoint and specify which particular policy-
related factors are at work as fixed policy effects can only statistically ‘explain’ parts of 
the overall variance, but cannot provide us with substantial answers. It remains to be 
analyzed which characteristics are responsible for differences between policies and 
policy sectors. For now, we hypothesize that cross-policy variance is due to the distri-
butional implications of different policies. These can vary with respect to the scope and 
reach or the market making (negative integration) and market shaping (positive integra-
tion) nature of European legislation (cf. Majone 1993; Zürn 1997; Scharpf 2002). Also, 
policies differ in their respective compliance costs and benefits for a state, and the is-
sue salience of policies can vary within a state, e.g. fishery-related norms may matter 
less than environmental ones in Austria, but more in Spain. Therefore, future research 
needs to refine our existing hypotheses that primarily focus on member states, their 
power and capacity. Besides policy factors, these new hypotheses could also account 
for the characteristics of individual legal acts (e.g. degree of precision or regulatory 
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